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I. Research backgrounds and justification of the topic 
I.1. Research history 
Corruption as an arborescent and many faced phenomenon has 
always been present in the fabric of human society. As a social 
topos it has a long history, however, it has gained dominant 
importance in the national and international public discourse during 
the past decades. 
In the past 15 years several Hungarian researchers and research 
institutions have examined the topic. New workshops were 
established, conferences and media events were organized on a 
regular basis. As for public representation both international 
(Leiken 1997) and Hungarian researchers (Szántó et al. 2011) 
found that the number of the press appearances of the cases 
suspected of corruption has been growing in the latter decades. An 
independent journal dealt with the topic earlier (Corruption and 
Reform), as well as a number of domestic and foreign periodicals 
edited a special issue for the topic concerned. The research of the 
phenomenon has diverse and rich methodological and theoretical 
approach, and it is examined both on micro- and macro level, 
however, it can be said that several of its areas are a scientific blind 
spot. 
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I.2. The justification and outlining of the topic  
One of the subfields that needs exploration is the corruption 
network in Hungary, it is a multi-actor one, and it can be described 
as a network which occasionally has hierarchical relations, usually 
evolves and acts within legal organisations.1 One of the 
opportunities of a deeper understanding is to analyse corruption 
crimes ended with a legally binding judgement. 
In my paper I take a new approach. With the help of a process 
oriented model drawn up independently, multi-actor, network type 
corruption organisations taking shape inside legal organisations 
will be analysed. I created a new typology, in which the type of 
patriarchal and bureaucratic corruptions is distinguished and, as a 
new element, it is argued why we may interpret certain corruption 
cases as a destructive enterprise.2 In my dissertation those 
patriarchal corruption organisations are examined, which show 
one possible form of the baumolian (1994) a destructive enterprise. 
                                                          
1 On the basis of one of our previous researches, the number of these 
organizations has risen in the past years (Szántó et al. 2011). 
2 I call destructive venture those enterprises that are harmful on macro-social 
level, and where the members in the course of the execution of the corruption 
accomplish a corrupt or a destructive innovation, while misusing their (public) 
power. 
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I.3. Research questions 
In my dissertation I look for the answer to the question: Why are 
there corruption configurations of multi-actors, occasionally with 
hierarchical relations which have the resemblance of the structure 
of an enterprise? Why is it worth creating an organized corruption 
association when the market would be able to develop the ”price 
mechanism” of the corruption and to regulate it? How these 
associations may come into existence, and why they may work 
successfully? By successfulness I mean that the participants 
permanently are able to provide benefits for themselves, which 
otherwise they could only get on a very costly manner, if at all – 
although, the present research would not be possible if the 
participants had not been caught. Also by pointing to the weak 
chain-links the causes of failure are shown. In the case studies on 
the one hand I look for an answer to how (inter)personal and 
institutional factors make it possible that the corrupt transactions, 
for the participants, could work as a systemic reallocation 
mechanism on the basis of personal interest; on the other hand, I 
would also like to know what led to their failure? 
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II. Methodology 
II.1. Field of research 
In my research work cases that ended with a legally binding 
judgement were analysed. The research is descriptive and 
explanatory research, the analysis is done on a micro level. The 
thesis fills a gap in research work. On the one hand it seeks to learn 
about and describe the participants, the events and situations of the 
corruption cases, on the other hand it also aims to explain certain 
processes.  The dissertation examines how research results fit in the 
framework of the theories applied as well as in the framework of 
my notion of patriarchal corruption and process oriented model. 
 
II.2. Methods and sources 
In my research several different methods were used to gain 
information. Beside the review of literature there is a chapter of 
general description where certain statistical characteristics of the 
chosen corruption crimes are summed up. Then in three case 
studies, by the help of document analysis of the judicial documents, 
network-like, multi-actor, enterprise-like corrupt organizations are 
described. In case newspaper articles concerning the cases contain 
relevant information, this is also used for the analysis. The judicial 
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materials usually give the more important elements of the 
regulatory environment which are used to the cases. 
The main source of the empirical part of the dissertation is 
based on www.birosag.hu webpage. Opening the menu item 
jurisprudence of “Judicial Decisions” which makes it possible to 
search between cases ended with judicial decision. One can find 
here cases ended with legal verdicts. In my thesis a detailed account 
is given of the method and reasoning. Here I only note that I tried 
to harmonize the terminology of the theory of sociology and that of 
legal practice. In Hungarian legal practice only bribery and 
extortion belongs to corruption crimes in a strict sense3 –, however, 
as I argue, in a wider sense embezzlement and fraud also belong to 
this category. Accordingly, I focused on the afore mentioned 
corruption crimes in my research work, however, since 
embezzlement and fraud can be regarded as intertwining crimes 
they were also taken into account. Basically from the four ideal-
types three were taken into account when searching for relevant 
decisions of the court database.  
                                                          
3 In my dissertation extortion is used as „accepting bribery” (enforcing). 
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III. Results 
III.1. Results concerning the new approach of corruption  
 As for the new corruption typology, results justify that the 
formation and function of patriarchal corruption is made 
possible by structures resting on traditional structures, which 
can be characterized with vertical relations from time to time, 
in which case infringement entailing the corruption is (also) 
induced by the strong traditional norms. 
 The examples of the case studies point out that the relationship 
between the parties has usually a long history, and contain high 
trust capital. The goodwill trust based on personal experiences 
(Sako 1998), helps not only to overcome the pressure caused by 
illegal activity, but, due to the long term commitment, fosters 
the recurrence of the crime. 
 The selected cases support the conception that certain 
corruption cases can be interpreted as a destructive enterprise. 
The corrupt or destructive innovation which first appeared as 
an idea of the main parties, and is described by the newly 
created concept, was present in all cases. 
 Bureaucracies are multipotent power formations, because they 
can create and operate different social organizing mechanisms. 
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My new approach points out that the preparators of corruption 
can execute a change in the institutional mode of operation, and 
dedicate some of the system specific characteristics to their own 
personal interest. 
 
III.2. Results of the innovative process oriented model  
The importance of the preparatory stage: 
 it shows the role of the entrepreneurial past and the effect of 
the socio-economic environment; 
 it demonstrates the importance of the knowledge of institution 
rules and functions; 
 it points out the significance of having the resources at one's 
disposal; 
 it sheds light on the (probable) importance of the testing of the 
basic idea of the corruption;  
 it accentuates that the resource mass insured by a constructed 
(bureaucratic) organization makes it possible to mobilize the 
destructive entrepreneurial idea – and thus the allowance of 
acquisition; 
 it stresses that the corruption hole can be discovered only by 
those persons who have an insight onto the deficiencies of the 
institution and the regulation environment, while corrupt 
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innovation can be performed by those who see an opportunity 
in the deficiency and is capable to connect it to new consumer 
demands. 
The importance of the transactional stage:  
 it puts into the forefront that the partners in the corruption can 
embed their activities in legal activities; 
 it shows that while the role of the agents is stable, that of the 
clients is flexible; 
 it shows that the destructive innovation profit of the key figures 
and the commission (brokerage) is typically appears in cash; 
 it stresses the importance of the undamaged reputation of those 
offering the corrupt service, as well as the importance of 
bargain between the parties; 
 it points out that the most important factor of choosing a partner 
is the strategically particularized, personally and situationally 
dependent trust, based on personal experience, the existence of 
which provides assurance. 
The importance of the closing stage: 
 it sheds light on the reasons of getting caught – like 
unscrupulous bribery combined with (in some cases) a non-
efficient client selection; 
 it underlines the importance of controlling; 
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 it highlights the fact that the employees of the constructed 
organisations are merely partially informed; the lack of 
information (may) lead to miscalculation and eventually to 
being caught.  
 
III.3. Why is it worth forming a corrupt association? 
My research results show that there are different motivation forces 
from different places that stimulate the parties to form (and run) 
such associations. They feel that it is worth triggering such 
formation because: 
 regarding their personal qualities they experienced that they 
have the necessary skills and abilities;  
 being the part of a constructed organization they know how it 
works, they are familiar with its culture, what is more they have 
the power and can make decisions,4 which makes resources 
representing value and subject of barter available for them;  
 they have specific technical knowledge concerning their scope 
of activities, they understand the opportunities of their tasks, 
they have practical experience (praxis), and together with these 
they are capable of recognizing new needs; 
                                                          
4 Or at least they can gain influence over these resources.  
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 they see economic perspective in corruption, they see it as 
something that produces income; they can reduce or eliminate 
transactional costs in numerous ways, and their power position 
often enables them to determine prices; 
 they have strong social contacts of a long history, which often 
carry trust capital; 
 they realize that the very nature of the crime makes it possible 
to embed it into their daily routine, thus it can be kept a secret 
from their bosses and from their micro-environment; 
 due to their position they feel necessary to protect the stability 
of their social relations, and (partly) due to the pressure of the 
cultural environment, to foster their (own) family’s welfare 
situation; 
 their activities can be harmonized with their value preferences, 
and in case of getting publicity the cultural norms of the given 
environment would not put them under a wrecking pressure; 
 there is value crisis in the macro-society, it does not mediate 
towards its members a clear value-model which unambiguously 
disapproves the practice of the corruption. 
Based on the above said, one may say that it is worth creating an 
organized corruption association, because it is effective resource 
and relation-generating association embedded in the micro- and 
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macro environment, and in accordance with the subjective values 
of the founder(s), it triggers a profitable income redistribution 
mechanism. In other words: patriarchal corruption organization 
means a more beneficial pattern of contact organization than 
bureaucratic corruption, since as opposed to the latter one it ensures 
a social field that can be supervised, that is, patriarchal corruption 
is (relatively) safe.5 
 
III.4. What is corruption from a sociological point of view? 
In my thesis not only the definition with a sociological viewpoint, 
but many of the results are new. Thus corruption is: 
 a destructive redistributive mechanism, which typically gives 
resources to the members of a privileged group, the act is 
against the interest of the society as a whole, is against the law, 
thus rearranges (violates) the previous power relations. 
 Due to the criterion that one has to belong to a certain group, 
the phenomenon is exclusive: only those can be part of the 
transaction that is capable of barter and of presenting the 
content and format of reliability. The domain of exclusion can 
                                                          
5 In a sense that the participants know who they are dealing with, what the subject 
of the business is, what the expected costs, advantages are, who plays what roles 
etc. 
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be understood as material as well as abstract ideas. Corruption 
therefore does not create wide-range social participation, 
therefore it is a selective integrating mechanism. 
 For those who are up to the above mentioned criteria it is an 
adaptation strategy, method to assimilate to the world, it offers 
for example an alternative mobility corridor and expands the 
possibility of mobility (see Gambetta 1988). It is a 
compensation opportunity to counteract the failure of legal 
mobility, and as such, it is a power-generating institution, 
because it makes possible to gain influence within the relation-
system of the otherwise closed power structures. 
 Corruption influences not only the life of people belonging to 
the top and middle classes, but also affects the life of the poor. 
It is as much as the means of survival of those without power 
than it is the form of gaining destructive rent-seeking. 
 Finally, corruption can be seen as the sign of dissatisfaction, the 
institution of distrust as far as environment and impersonal 
institutions are concerned. In case of business corruption, it is 
the distance formed against institutions, while in case of 
administrative corruption, it is the indicator of public distrust. 
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